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THE “MACRO” AND THE “MICRO” OF LEGITIMACY: 
TOWARDS A MULTI-LEVEL THEORY OF THE LEGITIMACY PROCESS 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
The distinction of macro- and micro-foundations of institutions implies a multi-level 
conceptualisation of institutional processes. We adopt the evaluators’ perspective on legitimacy 
to develop a multi-level theory of the legitimacy process under ideal-type conditions of 
institutional stability and institutional change, and explore the dynamics of institutional change – 
from destabilization of the institutional order to return to stability in legitimacy judgments 
expressed by evaluators. We argue that through the process of institutionalization, legitimacy 
judgments of evaluators are subjected to social control and describe an institutional stability loop 
– a cross-level positive-feedback process that ensures persistence of legitimacy judgments and 
stability of the institutional order. Viewing institutional stability as a state of suppressed micro-
level diversity, we draw researchers’ attention to “silenced” legitimacy judgments and to 
judgment suppressor factors that induce evaluators to abstain from making their deviant 
judgments public. The removal of such factors leads to the (re-)emergence of competing 
judgments in public communications and creates an opportunity for institutional change. We 
explore competitive strategies that address propriety or validity components of legitimacy and 
describe the process through which organizational fields return into a state of institutional 
stability.  
 
Keywords: organizational legitimacy, social judgments, multi-level theory, evaluator 
perspective, propriety, validity, institutionalization, judgment suppressor factors
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INTRODUCTION 
The attention to micro-foundations of institutions (Jepperson, 1991; Powell & Colyvas, 
2008) implies a multilevel conceptualization of institutional processes and thus requires 
“specifying relationships among variables at different levels” (Rousseau, 1985: 8). It has been 
observed that “levels issues pervade organizational theory and research. No construct is level 
free” (Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994) and that a “comprehensive explanation of organizational 
phenomena must, necessarily, include concepts from multiple levels of analysis” (Kozlowski & 
Klein, 2000). Despite attention of early institutional theory scholars to micro-level psychological 
and socio-cognitive aspects of institutions (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Zucker, 1977), the 
organizational research of the last two decades has focused primarily on organization- and field-
level units of analysis (Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Schneiberg & Clemens, 2006). The researchers 
addressed organizations’ efforts to establish and protect their legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; 
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), institutionalization and diffusion of new practices (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) or deinstitutionalization of old ones (Maguire, Hardy, 
& Lawrence, 2004; Sine & David, 2003).  
The little attention that institutional theorists have paid to level issues is particularly 
striking, given that the key questions of institutional theory – the questions about sources of 
institutional stability and change (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005) – are essentially questions of cross-level interactions within the social system 
(Barley, 2011). The exploration of level interactions is critical for understanding the duality of 
macro-level institutional processes, which are enacted by individuals (Powell & Colyvas, 2008), 
and micro-level processes, through which actors create, alter, and destroy institutions. The issue 
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of levels and level interactions is thus fundamental to institutional theory, and both conceptual 
and empirical research are required to explore cross-level interactions within the social system.  
In this paper we seek to develop a multi-level theory of organizational legitimacy, one of 
the key concepts of institutional theory (Suchman, 1995; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Tost, 
2011). We approach organizational legitimacy from the evaluator’s perspective, i.e., we 
approach it not as a property or an asset owned by an organization, but as a judgment with 
respect to that organization rendered by individuals at the micro level and by collective actors at 
the macro level (Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011; Walker, Thomas, & Zelditch, 1986; Zelditch & 
Walker, 1984). The approach focused on legitimacy judgment formation requires attention to 
evaluators’ cognition, which manifests itself in the communication and the non-verbal actions of 
these actors. We regard cognition and communication among evaluators as essential elements of 
the cross-level legitimacy process and thus extend discursive and rhetorical approaches to 
legitimacy (Green, 2004; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Vaara & Tienari, 2008) to the 
exploration of social influence and institutional strategies that competing actors use to change 
legitimacy judgments of individual evaluators.  
In the sections that follow, we address questions of how a multi-level approach can explain 
why actors at the micro level are still capable of changing institutions, despite the “iron cage” of 
institutional norms and collective beliefs, and how competition among judgments in an unstable 
institutional environment leads to judgment institutionalization, suppression of “deviant” 
legitimacy judgments
1
, and eventual stabilization of the institutional order. First, we draw 
attention to fairly distinct processes that unfold at the macro and micro levels. We then develop a 
multilevel theory of the legitimacy process under conditions of institutional stability and 
institutional change and describe the social dynamics of institutional change – from 
destabilisation of the institutional order to return to stability in evaluators’ legitimacy judgments.  
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Organizational Legitimacy at Individual and Collective Levels 
Organizational legitimacy. The definition of legitimacy has been the subject of many de-
bates in organizational theory (Berger, Ridgeway, Fisek, & Norman, 1998; Hannan, Carroll, 
Dundon, & Torres, 1995; Suchman, 1995). The extant literature converges on Suchman’s (1995) 
definition of legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” (574).  An important aspect of legitimacy is that it is a “generalized”, 
collective perception, which, although composed of subjective legitimacy judgments of individu-
als (Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011), is aggregated and objectified (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) at 
the collective level. Since it reflects the degree of collective approval of an organization 
(Johnson, 2004; Johnson, Dowd, & Ridgeway, 2006; Suchman, 1995), legitimacy is often re-
garded as an objective organizational resource or attribute independent of the endorsement of 
single individuals (Golant & Sillince, 2007; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002).  
Legitimacy evaluators. Nevertheless, although legitimacy can be viewed as an asset 
“owned” by a certain actor – an individual, organization or category of organizations, legitimacy 
still remains a social evaluation made by others. Those actors that confer legitimacy (hereafter 
evaluators) can be individuals or collective actors, namely groups, organizations, or field-level 
actors, such as the media or regulators. Evaluators make judgments about the social properties of 
an organization or a category and, through their actions, generate positive (or negative) social, 
political, and economic outcomes.  
Although ontologically it is individual evaluators who perceive, analyze and make 
judgments (Jepperson & Meyer, 2011; Watkins, 1952), it is often collective actors 
(organizations, associations, interest groups, governments, etc.) who act upon some “collective” 
legitimacy judgment. For instance, by entering into exchange relations with another actor or by 
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establishing an alliance or partnership, an organization (as a collective actor) renders a judgment 
about the appropriateness of such a relationship, given the legitimacy of the prospective partner. 
Similarly, government and judicial authorities arrive, through a set of internal procedures, to a 
legitimacy judgment with respect to the focal organization or category, and then disseminate 
their judgment as an official verdict. Thus, legitimacy evaluation does not exclusively take place 
at the micro level, i.e., within the bounds of the mental operations of individuals (Tost, 2011), but 
also encompasses sensemaking of collective actors (Daft & Weick, 1984), who act upon some 
“collective”, macro-level legitimacy judgment.  
Propriety and Validity 
Since both individual and collective actors render legitimacy judgments and interact with 
each other, it is important to recognize that legitimacy is a fundamentally cross-level construct 
consisting of two components present at different levels – individual-level propriety and collec-
tive-level validity (Dornbusch & Scott, 1975; Johnson et al., 2006; Tost, 2011; Zelditch, 2011). 
The first, individual-level component, termed propriety, represents an evaluator’s approval 
of the organization, its actions or practices as desirable and appropriate (Dornbusch & Scott 
1975; Johnson et al. 2006). The second component, validity refers to “the extent to which there 
appears to be a general consensus within a collectivity that the entity is appropriate for its social 
context” (Tost, 2011: 689). Thus, propriety is an individual evaluator’s own judgment of social 
acceptability – a micro-level construct, while validity represents a collective consensus about 
legitimacy that is present at some higher level, such as the group, organization, organizational 
field, or society.  
As individual evaluators observe other actors and receive messages from them conveying 
the validity judgment, they form a validity belief, or judgment on what the validated “consensus” 
is. Thus, legitimacy is present at the macro level in a form of validity, while at the micro level, 
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evaluators use two perceptual inputs to form their legitimacy judgments: (1) they assess 
propriety based on perceptions of the organization, its behaviors and characteristics, and (2) they 
form validity beliefs, which are based on their perception of the macro-level validity, i.e., on the 
perception of consensus opinion about that organization that exists at the collective level 
(Dornbusch & Scott, 1975; Tost, 2011; Zelditch & Walker, 2000).  
The construct of validity describes the primary mechanism through which collective 
legitimacy judgments at the society, field, or organization level influence individual evaluators. 
As noted by Weber (1978 [1924]), evaluators comply with rules, values, and beliefs that they 
consider valid, even if they privately disagree with them. Social psychology has accumulated 
strong evidence that subjective judgments are profoundly influenced by authority and majority 
opinion (Asch, 1956; Erb, Bohner, Hewstone, Werth, & Reinhard, 2006; Gould, 2002; Milgram, 
1974; Muchnik, Aral, & Taylor, 2013). Validity thus represents one of the most powerful 
legitimacy judgment heuristics, as individuals rely heavily on the collective “validity” opinion in 
making their own propriety assessments. There is also experimental evidence of the effect of 
validity not only on the evaluators’ assessments of propriety, but also on their propensity to 
protest, or seek change to the existing social structure (Walker, Rogers, & Zelditch, 1988).  
Sources of validity. As multiple evaluators express the same propriety judgment and ob-
serve others expressing it too, they gain greater reassurance in the validity of their judgment, in 
that it represents a consensus opinion shared by others. The opinion of majority is thus one of the 
basic sources of validity cues for evaluators. Validity is affected not only by the majority opin-
ion. Some institutions of society - media, government, and the judicial system - have evolved into 
critical sources of validity that fundamentally influence other evaluators’ judgments. Each of 
these judgment validation institutions provides some form of a forum for debates over legitimacy 
and a mechanism for debate resolution. They process multiple, often conflicting legitimacy 
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judgments of evaluators, select and codify in written texts the most “appropriate” judgment, and 
by communicating it back to evaluators, provide them with an important validity cue that guides 
evaluators’ future judgments and behaviors.  
Judgment validation by the media, the government, or the judicial system is usually a com-
petitive process. Each of these three judgment validation institutions has its own rules of compe-
tition and practices of contest resolution, as well as its own genres of judgment validation texts, 
that is, written documents in which the validated judgment is recorded. Thus, in the media, it is 
the share of voice that determines the evaluator’s perception of validity; with the government, it 
is the regulators’ and legislators’ decisions that confer validity to the winning judgment, while in 
the legal domain it is the judgments of judges or juries (the “delivered law” - LoPucki & 
Weyrauch, 2000) that set precedents and thus establish validity for future judgments on similar 
cases. These judgments are then communicated to other actors in legal opinions and other texts 
that constitute the body of “written law” (LoPucki & Weyrauch, 2000).  
It should be noted that it is individuals who participate in the judgment formation process 
within these institutions – journalists, bureaucrats, elected officials, jury members or judges. 
Hence, the observations on legitimacy judgment formation by individual evaluators (see below) 
will also apply to these individuals. However, collective decision-making within these judgment 
validation institutions adds additional complexity to the judgment validation process that they 
perform. The research on power, politics, and decision-making processes (Daft & Weick, 1984; 
Hardy & Clegg, 1996; Kaplan, 2008) can inform our understanding of legitimacy judgment for-
mation in organizations and other types of collective actors. 
In addition to the media, the government, and the judicial system, some validation func-
tions are also assumed by trade associations (Barnett, 2006; Lawrence, 1999; Rao, 2004), watch-
dog organizations (Rao, 1998), and actors in subject positions with the “right to speak” (Maguire 
Page 8 of 59Academy of Management Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
 9
et al., 2004; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004), such as representatives of interest groups, ex-
perts, opinion leaders (Pollock & Rindova, 2003), or stock analysts (Certo, 2003). However, the-
se actors influence judgments of others through one of the three judgment validation institutions: 
the media, the government, and the judicial system.  
The sections that follow present a multi-level model of the legitimacy process and describe 
how macro-level validity influences evaluators’ propriety judgments and how, in turn, 
evaluators’ judgments of propriety together create macro-level validity. 
A MULTI-LEVEL THEORY OF THE LEGITIMACY PROCESS 
Institutional Stability and Change 
Institutional theory emphasises the enduring nature of institutions: once established, they 
tend to last (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1977). 
Nevertheless, they do not exist forever. Old institutions decline and new ones are created through 
the efforts of individual and collective actors. The literature on institutional entrepreneurship 
(David, Sine, & Haveman, 2013; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Maguire et al., 2004) and 
institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009; Maguire & 
Phillips, 2008) has explored how institutions, organizations and categories gain or lose their 
legitimacy and how new practices and organizational forms are legitimated and diffused. The 
concepts of legitimation (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Vaara & Tienari, 
2008), delegitimation (Sine & David, 2003; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) or relegitimation 
(Vaara & Tienari, 2011) refer to periods of high instability of legitimacy judgments and 
contestation of the social worth of the organization. Therefore, it is analytically important to 
distinguish between the legitimacy process under conditions of institutional stability and under 
conditions of institutional change. This distinction affects not only theory, but also methods and 
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measures that can be meaningfully used in exploration of relationships in the legitimacy process.  
Following the logic of institutional theory development over the past three decades, in the 
sections below we proceed from the exploration of sources of stability and isomorphism in 
legitimacy judgments to the exploration of legitimacy construction and contestation in unstable 
institutional environments. We then address the dynamics of institutional change – from 
destabilization of the institutional order and the legitimacy judgments that it prescribes to the 
return to stability – and explore the role of communication in stabilizing and destabilizing 
legitimacy judgments.  
The Legitimacy Process under Conditions of Institutional Stability 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) observed that institutions, once created, tend to persist even 
when they have lost their functionality. By rendering organizations and practices widely 
accepted and even taken for granted, institutionalization plays a crucial role in transmission of 
social order to a new generation (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Zucker, 1977) and in ensuring 
isomorphism and conformance in individual actors’ judgments and actions (Zucker, 1977). “To 
say that a segment of human activity has been institutionalized is already to say that this segment 
of human activity has been subsumed under social control” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 55). We 
argue here that evaluators’ activity of rendering legitimacy judgments is subject to institutional 
pressures, as any other form of social activity. Below we explore the mechanisms of social 
control of legitimacy judgments through validity and propriety. 
Institutionalization effects on validity. While propriety assessment is performed by 
individual evaluators (Dornbusch & Scott, 1975; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011; Zelditch & 
Walker, 1984), validity is the result of a process of aggregation of individual propriety judgments 
to some “collective” judgment. As propriety judgments are “externalized” through actions and 
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discourse of evaluators, the repeated judgments are habitualized, or “cast into a pattern, which 
can then be reproduced with an economy of effort…” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 53). In other 
words, they become a part of objective reality, they become institutionalized. Since 
institutionalization subsumes judgments under social control, in highly institutionalized 
environments there are judgments that are appropriate to express and there are judgments that are 
suppressed as socially unacceptable.  
The institutionalization of a legitimacy judgment implies that the stability of the social 
order is protected by two separate mechanisms: (1) by the institutionalization of an organization, 
structure or practice, and (2) by the institutionalization of the legitimacy judgment about it. In 
other words, under conditions of institutional stability, the evaluated entity is legitimate not only 
because it is perceived as congruent with social norms (i.e., has propriety), but also because the 
institutionalized collective legitimacy judgment (i.e., validity) pressures individual evaluators to 
express a positive legitimacy evaluation and suppress the public expression of negative 
judgments about it. For example, in local hockey fan subcultures it is often inappropriate to 
express a negative judgment with respect to the local team, even if the team chronically 
underperforms and is plagued with scandals. As a result, an organization can remain legitimate 
even if it deviates from individual evaluators’ expectations (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Suchman, 
1995). Thus, as is the case with other institutional processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977), the more institutionalized the legitimacy judgment (i.e., the greater the 
validity), the greater the conformity and isomorphism in legitimacy judgments openly expressed 
by evaluators. 
This double protection of the existing social order suggests that institutionalization of a 
positive legitimacy judgment about an entity confers substantial social benefits. In effect, it is 
validity, the institutionalized part of the legitimacy judgment that gives legitimacy its “resource” 
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properties. It is this part of the legitimacy judgment that organizations “own”, preserve, and use 
as an “asset” to facilitate the mobilization of resources, reduce resistance, and ensure the stability 
of their social and economic ties (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Suchman, 1995). By contrast, the institutionalization of a negative legitimacy 
judgment, or illegitimacy, may become an important liability for an organization, as is the case 
with tobacco, fast food, or arms companies (Vergne, 2012). 
Institutionalization effects on propriety. Individual evaluators assess propriety, or 
normative acceptability of an organization, by benchmarking the organization’s perceived 
properties and behaviors against a set of social norms (Dornbusch & Scott, 1975; Suchman, 
1995; Tost, 2011; Zelditch & Walker, 1984). Thus, one of the cognitive operations that an 
evaluator needs to perform to assess propriety is to select the appropriate set of social norms to 
be applied in the evaluation of the organization.  
The propriety judgment outcome heavily depends on the set of norms against which the 
evaluator chooses to benchmark the organization. In macro-institutional research, Ruef and Scott 
(1998) were among the first to draw attention to different sets of norms (managerial and 
technical) that can be used in legitimacy assessments. Micro-level evidence corroborates their 
findings: Lamin and Zaheer (2012) showed that in judging organizational legitimacy, different 
types of stakeholders (termed “Wall Street” and “Main Street”) use different sets of norms 
(drawn respectively from economics and ethics) and arrive to different judgments about the 
legitimacy of a firm. Also, the research on framing and media effects (Scheufele, 1999) shows 
that in public debates over social issues, opponents promote competing sets of norms in their 
discourses, such as “environmental protection” vs. “economic development”, “free trade” vs. 
“job protection”, “cost-effectiveness” vs. “quality of care”, etc. Depending on which set of 
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norms is selected, an evaluator can arrive to different legitimacy judgments about an 
organization.  
As opposed to unstable institutional environments, where multiple sets of norms advanced 
by their proponents compete for minds of evaluators (see discussion below), in a stable 
institutional environment the choice of norms is “obvious”, since it is “taken for granted” that a 
particular set of norms (for example, an established technological or environmental standard) 
applies to a given type of organization. Thus, under conditions of institutional stability, 
evaluators’ legitimacy judgment activity is subject to social control through the process of 
institutionalization of the practice of applying a particular set of norms to a given type of 
organization (see link E in Figure 1 below). This, in turn, implies that the more institutionalized 
the legitimacy judgment (i.e., the greater the validity), the greater the conformity and 
isomorphism in the selection of norms to be used in propriety judgments about a given 
organization. 
 The effects described above suggest that institutions are socially constructed templates not 
only for action (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), but also for legitimacy 
judgments. Institutions control both which norms evaluators should apply in judging propriety 
and what the final expressed judgment should be (validity). Thus, under conditions of stability 
the DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) “iron cage” of institutional constraints extends to legitimacy 
judgments made by evaluators.  
The legitimacy process model under conditions of stability. The discussion above suggests 
that, under conditions of institutional stability, there is a substantial isomorphism in evaluators’ 
publicly communicated propriety judgments. The legitimacy judgment institutionalized at the 
organization or field level (i.e., validity) creates a conformity pressure on individual evaluators. 
Those evaluators who, due to their professional obligations (e.g., auditors, rating agencies, stock 
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analysts, some government regulators) or social vocation (e.g., consumer watchdogs and activists 
- (Rao, 1998)), still rely on their own propriety judgments are cognitively bound to apply the 
“taken-for-granted” set of norms that yields the same, already institutionalized judgment. And 
those who make a different, independent legitimacy judgment are a small minority and are often 
under social pressure to suppress the expression of their deviant opinion (Centola, Willer & 
Macy, 2005; Zhu & Westphal, 2011). Thus, under conditions of institutional stability, the 
legitimacy process is dominated by top-down influences – from higher levels down to the level 
of individual evaluators (links D, E, and K in Figure 1). The expressed judgments and actions of 
evaluators at all levels only reinforce the “consensus” and contribute to perpetuation of the 
institutionalized legitimacy judgment (i.e., validity), as other evaluators receive stronger and 
more consistent validity cues about the “socially approved” judgment.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The legitimacy process described above is illustrated in Figure 1, which presents a 
multilevel model of legitimacy judgment formation and reproduction. Given that legitimacy is a 
latent construct, the multi-level model reflects the social mechanism through which macro-
organizational antecedents of legitimacy translate into its macro-organizational outcomes and 
highlights the role and effect of lower-level, micro-organizational processes that interact with 
macro-level antecedents and outcomes. While the model presented in Figure 1 can be applied to 
the legitimacy process both under conditions of stability and under conditions of institutional 
change, the importance of causal effects outlined in the model differ for the two conditions. The 
bold arrows in Figure 1 highlight the most important elements of the legitimacy process under 
conditions of institutional stability.  
Perceptions. Individual evaluators at the micro level receive two perceptual inputs: 
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perceptions of the entity’s properties / behaviors (link A in Figure 1) and perceptions of validity 
(link D), which they form from observations over judgments aggregated and communicated by 
the media, regulations and judicial opinions, as well as from observations over actions and 
communications of other evaluators in their immediate social surrounding. The evaluator uses 
those inputs (links A and D) to make a propriety judgment (links B and C). However, under 
conditions of institutional stability, perceived validity (link C) has an overwhelming effect on the 
individual evaluator’s propriety assessment, and the evaluation path going through link B plays a 
minor role or is inactive.  
Judgments. The adoption of the validity judgment (link C) requires little mental effort (cf. 
“passive mode” of judgment formation in Tost, 2011) and amounts to a conformity with the 
judgment that the evaluator perceives as the most widely accepted. By contrast, the formation of 
an independent propriety judgment based on observed properties and behaviors of the 
organization (link B) requires greater mental effort (cf. active, or “evaluative” mode in Tost, 
2011). In this evaluation, the available information on properties and behaviors of the 
organization is benchmarked against some set of social norms (link H) in order to determine 
whether the organization is “desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574).  
Since multiple sets of applicable norms may co-exist in an organizational field (Kaplan, 
2008; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012; Ruef & Scott, 1998), evaluators in the active, “evaluative” mode 
may face the task of selecting among several sets of norms that can be applied in a propriety 
judgment (link H). However, under conditions of institutional stability, institutionalization 
affects not only the judgment that evaluators are expected to make (link D), but also the set of 
norms that they should use if they were to do an independent propriety evaluation (link E). Often 
such norms are institutionalized in a form of certification programs established by governments 
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or industry associations (AACSB, ISO, etc.) and standards created by private and public actors 
(GAAP, GRI, UN Global Compact, etc.). These programs and standards specify normative 
expectations and ensure organizations’ formal compliance with them. 
Thus, under conditions of institutional stability, even if the evaluator makes an independent 
propriety assessment based on his/her own observations (link B), his/her bounded cognition 
dictates the application of the same institutionalized set of norms that are suggested by the 
media, regulators, judges or other actors (link E). Under conditions of stability, these two 
evaluation paths - through links D-C and through links E-H - are equifinal (Fiss, 2007; 
Kozlowski & Klein, 2000), since the perceived validity (link D) and the suggested set of 
applicable norms for propriety evaluation (link E) lead the evaluator to the same, already 
institutionalized legitimacy judgment.  
Actions. Not all judgments are necessarily publicly expressed in the discourse and actions 
of evaluators. Individuals are capable of anticipating the social and personal consequences of 
public expression of their judgment (link G) and may have important reasons to suppress the 
expression of their opinion (link M). This may occur especially if their opinion is different from 
the institutionalized judgment, the validity (Zelditch & Walker, 1984), and they have reasons to 
anticipate social sanctions for deviant judgment expression (link K). The fear of sanctions is 
particularly present in countries with totalitarian regimes (Kuran, 1995), where any criticism of 
the government’s actions may lead to accusations of lack of patriotism, questionable moral 
values, and even treason (see the following section for a detailed discussion of judgment 
suppression). Thus, before a judgment is expressed in actions, evaluators assess the degree of 
perceived deviance of their judgment, as well as the probability and severity of sanctions that 
they may be subjected to for openly expressing their independent opinion. 
As multiple individual evaluators proceed to express the conforming legitimacy judgment 
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in discourse and actions (link L), they produce macro-organizational effects: a direct effect on 
the organization (e.g., formation of exchange ties – see link J) and/or an indirect effect through 
discursive influence on the media, regulators and/or judges (link I), as well as on other 
individuals in the evaluators’ immediate social surrounding (link F). However, under conditions 
of stability, the evaluators’ expressed judgments are isomorphic and will only reinforce the 
institutionalized “consensus” judgment (validity) and further contribute to stability of the social 
order in the organizational field.  
As a result, the evaluators’ influence on judgment validation institutions (link I) is not 
significant under conditions of institutional stability: In the absence of contestation and 
controversy, the media, regulators and the judicial system do not require constant reaffirmation 
of their validated judgment and, as long as the institutional environment is stable, they are not 
subjected to challenges by individual evaluators. The media attention is low, as there is nothing 
“interesting” or “media-worthy” about something that is already routinely acceptable. The 
attention of regulators is also low, since the regulations pertaining to the issue have already been 
adopted and are not contested by anyone. The judicial system does not have to intervene much 
either, since most members of society routinely conform to the institutionalized norm, and 
judicial decisions, if any, are routine in a sense that they do not require any revisions to the 
institutionalized norm established in the written law and set legal precedents. Thus, under 
conditions of stability, the judgment validation institutions are still present to communicate the 
validity judgment (link D), to prescribe which set of norms should be used in evaluation (link E) 
or to apply sanctions for deviant judgment expression (link K), but micro-level actors do not 
produce any significant bottom-up impact on these institutions.  
By contrast, link F under conditions of institutional stability remains active, since 
individuals expressing the institutionalized norms in their actions and discourse continue to 
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influence other people around them. Such influence plays an important role in the socialization 
of new members of society, who learn by observing others. It is primarily through this link that 
institutionalized social norms are transferred to a new generation (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). 
Judgment validation institutions. An organization’s validity is not directly observable, 
since there is rarely a single measure or authority that can pronounce the validity judgment for 
the whole society or an organizational field. Validity is inferred by individual evaluators 
(including researchers) from judgments “aggregated” and communicated by macro-level 
judgment validation institutions (media, regulators, and judicial system) and from observable 
behavior and discourse of other actors. This macro-to-micro influence process is represented by 
link D in Figure 1. Under conditions of institutional stability, the three judgment validation 
institutions are usually in agreement with each other: In the absence of a controversy, the media 
coverage of a legitimate organization tends to be low in volume and positive in tone (Green, 
2004; Green, Li, and Nohria, 2009), the organization’s properties and behaviors are recognized 
by authorities as conforming to the existing regulations (Deephouse, 1996), and attempts of 
litigation against it are less likely (Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Koh, Qian, & Wang, 2013).  
In summary, the judgment validation institutions and collective actors in evaluators’ 
immediate environment produce effects on perceptions, judgments, and actions of individual 
evaluators. They play a major role in shaping perceptions of validity (link D), they affect 
independent propriety judgments by prescribing which set of norms should be applied in 
evaluation (link E), and, finally, if the evaluator still performs an independent assessment and 
renders a deviant judgment, they are ready to apply sanctions (link K) to discourage the 
expression of the deviant opinion (see discussion below). 
The institutional stability loop. The bold arrows in Figure 1, which highlight the dominant 
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effects under conditions of institutional stability, form a loop that circles between micro and 
macro levels. This loop has a positive feedback mechanism that produces stability in the 
legitimacy process: The greater the institutionalization of a legitimacy judgment (validity – link 
D), the more the norms applied in propriety judgments made by individual evaluators are taken-
for-granted (link E), and the more the deviant judgments are suppressed (link K), the more 
isomorphic the expressed legitimacy judgments are. The more isomorphic the judgment 
expressed by multiple evaluators, the greater the perception of validity of that judgment (link D). 
Hereafter we refer to this circular legitimacy process as the institutional stability loop.  
We can further discern three macro-to-micro influence paths within the institutional 
stability loop. Along the passive-processing path (links D-C), evaluators operate in the passive 
mode of judgment formation and draw on validity cues to reduce mental effort (Tost, 2011). 
Along the active-processing path (links E-H), evaluators operate in the active, “evaluative” 
(Tost, 2011) mode of judgment formation and invest mental effort to reach a judgment. The 
active-processing path is engaged if the influence through passive-processing path has failed to 
control the evaluator’s propriety judgment, and the evaluator has chosen to make an independent 
judgment based on the observed properties and behaviors of the organization (link B). The cross-
level influence through the active-processing path ensures that the evaluator selects the 
institutionally prescribed set of norms, which drives his/her independent propriety assessment to 
the same, already institutionalized legitimacy judgment. Finally, if a deviant judgment is formed 
despite the social influence through links D and E, the coercive path (through link K) penalizes 
the public expression of the deviant judgment. The more severe and regular are the sanctions for 
deviance (link K), the greater the evaluators’ fear and the greater the probability that they will 
suppress the deviant judgment expression (link M).  
It should be noted that the ability to impose sanctions on other actors is not the exclusive 
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prerogative of regulators or the judicial system: Media attacks, ostracism by peers, or terrorism 
by individuals or groups are just a few examples of sanctions by actors with no authority that can 
be used to silence an unwanted judgment expression. The intensity of coercive path utilization by 
judgment validation institutions and other actors reflects the degree of instability of the 
institutional order. In particularly stable institutional environments where the institutionalization 
has reached a taken-for-grantedness state (Sine & David, 2003; Suchman, 1995), most of the 
social influence occurs through the passive-processing path, with minimal involvement of active-
processing and coercive paths. On the other hand, the more individual evaluators privately 
disagree and are forced through the coercive path to suppress the expression of their deviant 
judgment, the more the social environment is prone to destabilization, such as sudden revolutions 
(Kuran, 1995) or other forms of disruptive institutional change (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).    
The Legitimacy Process under Conditions of Institutional Change 
While in some time periods the legitimacy process can be stable and the stable social order 
recursively reproduces itself (Giddens, 1984), in periods characterized by major environmental 
jolts (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Sine & David, 2003) or successful institutional 
entrepreneurship by some actors (Maguire et al., 2004; Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000), the 
institutional environment can be in turmoil caused by changes in social norms, values, and 
judgments. In the Figure 2 below we present a model of the legitimacy process under conditions 
of institutional change.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 Under conditions of institutional change, multilevel relationships, such as the ones 
outlined in the process model above, may prove bidirectional (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000), and a 
Page 20 of 59Academy of Management Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
 21
different set of causal relationships may dominate the legitimacy process. The bold arrows 
highlight the most influential effects under conditions of institutional change.  
In these conditions, the influence of the passive-processing path of the institutional stability 
loop (links D-C), which further reinforces validity, is weakened or suppressed. The perception of 
validity (link D) is particularly weak in the presence of conflicting legitimacy judgments at the 
macro level. This occurs when there is a major debate over issue interpretation in the media 
(Hoffman, 1999) or when there is a disagreement between judgments validated by the media, 
regulators, and/or the legal system. Common to these contexts is that more critical legitimacy 
judgments openly contradict the status quo and thus create a sense of illegitimacy of the 
institutionalized order. In the absence of a perceived “consensus” in the field, evaluators are less 
trusting of the contradictory validity cues that they receive from the environment (link D) and are 
therefore more likely to rely on their own, independent propriety assessment (cf. the evaluative 
mode of judgment in Tost, 2011). As these independent propriety judgments are less affected by 
the validity, they can become a major driver of institutional change: they can problematize the 
status quo, create the sense of illegitimacy of the old validity judgment, and offer a more 
legitimate alternative to the established institutional order. It has been observed that perceptions 
of illegitimacy can motivate evaluators to actively resist a social order and engage in institutional 
change efforts (Haack, Pfarrer, Scherer, 2014; Tost, 2011). 
Thus, under conditions of institutional change, the institutional stability loop that circles 
through link D in the model is inactive or substantially weakened by the presence of deviant 
judgments, while the path encompassing an individual evaluator’s own perceptions (link A) and 
a propriety judgment based on the assessment of those perceptions (link B) against a selected set 
of applicable norms (link H) becomes more prominent and influential.  
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While in laboratory experiments (e.g., Walker et al., 1988; Zelditch & Walker, 1984) 
evaluators are usually exposed to a single validity cue, the real-world social environment 
undergoing change comprises multiple collective actors (organizations, interest groups, trade 
associations, etc.), each advancing a particular perspective formed through aggregation of 
interests and judgments of lower-level actors. In the case of a controversy, or contestation of an 
organization’s legitimacy in society, evaluators are exposed to multiple, often conflicting validity 
cues. Thus, the multi-level theory of legitimacy needs to account for the existence of multiple 
“validities” and describe socio-cognitive mechanisms for resolution of conflicting validity 
signals from the environment.  
Changes in perceptions. At the micro level, a particularly large incongruence between the 
new information about the organization (coming through link A) and the established validity 
(link D) prompts evaluators to attend more to their own propriety judgments (link B). In a study 
of evaluations of political candidates, Redlawsk and colleagues (Redlawsk, Civettini, & 
Emmerson, 2010) identified a “tipping point” at which increased anxiety caused by negative 
information about a candidate prompts an evaluator to revise the initially favorable judgment. At 
this point, the mismatch between the established collective validity and the incoming information 
triggers a “mental alarm” (Tost, 2011) that cannot be dismissed on the strength of the entrenched 
validity judgment. As multiple evaluators approach this “tipping point” and render independent 
propriety judgments based on the new information, the accumulation and diffusion of divergent 
propriety judgments erodes the perception of consensus around validity.  
At the macro level, the perception of “consensus” can be manipulated by creating an 
additional “independent” public voice that expresses the desired opinion. This strategy is known 
as constituency-building (Barley, 2010; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986). The voice consistent with the 
institutionalized legitimacy judgment creates a perception of greater consensus, and thereby 
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strengthens the effect of the institutional stability loop that perpetuates the status quo. By 
contrast, a contradicting voice, especially a prominent one, weakens the perception of consensus, 
reduces the effect of validity on individual evaluators’ judgments (link C), and stimulates 
evaluators to perform their own, independent propriety assessments (links B). The disruption 
caused by the contradicting voice creates an opportunity for changing the institutionalized 
legitimacy judgment. 
Changes in judgments. Another process that is activated in the absence of institutional 
stability is the selection of a set of social norms to be used as a benchmark in propriety 
judgments (link H). Under conditions of institutional stability, it is largely a “taken-for-granted” 
practice (see link E) that a certain norm (such as an industry standard – Garud, Jain, & 
Kumaraswamy, 2002) applies to a given type of organization or practice. However, in 
institutionally unstable contexts, evaluators tend to be less constrained in their selection of the 
sets of norms to apply, and several sets of norms may be in competition for the evaluator’s mind. 
Thus, as firms sponsoring different technological standards compete for dominance in an 
industry (e.g., Sony's Betamax vs. JVC's VHS) and other firms choose which of the two 
standards to follow, interest groups promoting application of different sets of norms to the issue 
(e.g., “environmental protection” vs. “economic development”) compete for minds of individual 
evaluators and the evaluators choose which set of norms to use in their propriety judgments. The 
presence of an alternative, competing set of norms weakens the effect of the institutional stability 
loop since the evaluators have a choice among several sets of norms, and depending on the set 
they choose, they may render and express a “deviant” propriety judgment that can undermine the 
established validity. 
Since application of different sets of norms (link H) can yield substantially different 
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legitimacy judgments, competing actors opportunistically promote the sets of norms that, when 
applied to the focal entity, yield the desired judgments. Thus, by suggesting which set of norms 
should be applied to an entity as a benchmark in propriety assessments, actors can lead an 
evaluator to a judgment that reflects their own preference or interest. 
Changes in actions. The legitimacy judgments formed by evaluators become consequential 
to the organization when they are expressed in evaluators’ discourse and actions (link L). The 
actions of evaluators can have direct consequences for the organization (link J), such as changes 
in availability of resources provided by evaluators, employee motivation, or investor support. 
Evaluators’ actions can also have indirect consequences, which are associated with the 
evaluator’s influence on the judgments of other actors and on judgment validation institutions – 
the media, regulators and the judicial system (link I). 
While under conditions of institutional stability the evaluators’ influence on judgment 
validation institutions (link I) is not significant (see discussion above), under conditions of 
institutional turmoil the expression of individuals’ judgments at the micro-level can produce a 
major effect on judgment validation institutions. The public controversy attracts media coverage, 
and the media coverage, in turn, attracts attention of an even greater number of individual 
evaluators. These evaluators become more informed and are more likely to make their own 
propriety judgment (link B), since the presence of competing judgments in the media weakens 
the focal organization’s perceived validity (link D) and creates a sense of illegitimacy. The 
attention of regulators rises as well, since open public questioning of the judgment validated in 
laws and regulations may warrant regulatory change. Regulators in such situations are subjected 
to influence by multiple competing interests (see discussion below). The judicial system under 
conditions of turmoil can also become an important battleground for competing legitimacy 
judgments. It has been observed that “the outcomes of cases in which the applicable norms differ 
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from the written law demonstrate that the norms, not the written law, are the driving force” 
(LoPucki & Weyrauch, 2000: 1435). Thus, when the validity of the written law is openly 
questioned, judges’ subjective perceptions of what judgment is the most valid may change, 
leading to new legal precedents.  
THE DYNAMICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: DESTABILISATION  
The two multi-level models of legitimacy process presented above describe ideal-type 
conditions of institutional stability and institutional change. However, of particular interest to 
institutional theory are also the social dynamics that leads to the destabilization of an established 
institutional order (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Sine & David, 2003) or to the stabilization of an 
institutional environment in turmoil (Maguire et al., 2004; Rao et al., 2000).  
The Paradox of Embedded Agency 
As explained above, under ideal-type conditions of institutional stability, the evaluators’ 
publicly expressed judgments are isomorphic and tend to reinforce the institutionalized “consen-
sus” judgment, which further contributes to stability of the social order. The presence of institu-
tionalization implies that the legitimacy process under conditions of stability is subject to the 
paradox of embedded agency: “If our norms and collective beliefs are institutionally determined, 
how can human agency be a factor in institutional change?” (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 
2009: 67). While this paradox presents an important challenge for macro-institutional research, 
the multi-level approach can help us reveal the micro-level assumptions behind this paradox and 
identify the factors that enable change in legitimacy judgments. 
From the multi-level perspective, the critical assumption of the paradox of embedded agen-
cy is the existence of isomorphism in propriety judgments at the lower, individual level. Never-
theless, the observed macro-level “unanimity” does not necessarily imply that everyone at the 
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micro level agrees: While some individuals may willingly agree with the institutionalized judg-
ment (validity), others, for various reasons (see Table 1 below), may have to suppress the expres-
sion of their “deviant” opinions. Similarly, it has been observed that actors may adopt institu-
tionalized practices for different reasons (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), and may hold the same atti-
tudes for different reasons too (Cameron, 2009). As a result, the observed macro-level consensus 
around the institutionalized judgment may conceal not only the diversity of privately held yet 
suppressed propriety judgments, but also the diversity of motives for why those judgments were 
not publicly communicated.  
This concealed diversity suggests that the paradox of embedded agency exhibits properties 
of what multi-level theory describes as ecological fallacy, or a situation where a researcher 
“wrongly infers relationships at the lower level based on either observations or analysis only at 
the higher level” (Slater, Snyder, & Hayes, 2006: 378). In relation to legitimacy judgments, this 
means that observations over macro-level validity cannot be used to infer that evaluators actually 
judge that entity as proper: their private propriety judgments may differ, as do the reasons for 
why these judgments are not expressed. Below we explore both judgment suppression and judg-
ment communication processes under conditions of stability and change. 
Suppression of Legitimacy Judgment Expression 
As mentioned earlier, not all legitimacy judgments are openly expressed by evaluators 
(Asch, 1956; Kuran, 1987; Noelle-Neumann & Petersen, 2004). The understanding of factors 
that suppress evaluators’ expression of deviant propriety judgments is important both for ex-
plaining the stable state of the social order and for describing the process of social order destabi-
lization. The social science literature has identified a number of factors that can prevent the ex-
pression of a deviant opinion. Table 1 provides examples of commonly encountered suppressor 
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factors. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The suppressor factors work either by maintaining the “passive mode” (Tost, 2011) in 
evaluators’ judgments (link C), and thus preventing active cognitive processing in propriety 
judgments (link B), or by discouraging the expression of an already formed deviant judgment 
(link M).  
Preventing active cognitive processing. As discussed above, in the passive mode, evalua-
tors avoid mental effort and rely on validity cues (link D) and other heuristics to render a legiti-
macy judgment. The passive mode has been found to constitute the baseline mode of mental op-
erations (Kahneman, 2011). By contrast, in the evaluative mode (link B), evaluators put forth an 
effort to actively deliberate and reassess their previous legitimacy judgment (Tost, 2011). Con-
textual factors, such as public discussion (Druckman & Nelson, 2003), evaluator’s accountability 
(Lerner & Tetlock, 1999), and absence of time pressure (Svenson & Maule, 1993) increase the 
likelihood that evaluators will form their judgments in the evaluative mode (link B), whereas in 
the absence of these factors, the independent, evaluative-mode propriety judgment is less likely 
(Haack et al., 2014). Furthermore, evaluator-specific characteristics, such as personal interest and 
previous knowledge, increase the likelihood that evaluators engage in active processing (Zaller, 
1992).   
As mentioned earlier, the more individuals are kept in the passive mode of judgment for-
mation (through the path D-C), the more stable is the institutional order. Therefore, efforts di-
rected at maintaining the passive mode, which prompts evaluators to adopt the institutionalized 
judgment (i.e., validity), play an important role in preventing institutional change. Such a preven-
tion is accomplished through interventions at link A: either by withholding critical pieces of in-
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formation that can trigger the “mental alarm” (Tost, 2011) in multiple evaluators, or by distract-
ing the evaluators’ attention with unrelated “sensational” news, by creating “noise” in the evalua-
tors’ information channels. 
Discouraging the public expression of deviant judgments. The public expression of devi-
ant judgments (links F and I) diminishes the validity of the dominant, institutionalized judgment, 
which, in turn, may lead to the destabilization of the existing institutional order and thus create 
an opportunity for institutional change. If the prevention of active cognitive processing has 
failed, and the evaluator has formed a deviant judgment (through link B), the maintenance of the 
status quo requires recourse to suppressor factors to prevent the public expression of this judg-
ment. Table 1 shows a wide variety of suppressor factors that prevent deviant judgment expres-
sion, as well as the diversity of events, environmental changes and individuals’ actions that can 
weaken or remove these factors.  
Given that most evaluators are motivated more by the anxiety of a loss than by the hope for 
a potential gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), most suppressor factors present a prospect of a 
substantial loss to the evaluator for having expressed a deviant judgment. Such suppressor fac-
tors create a situation where the expected private benefits of judgment expression are much 
smaller than the private costs or punishments that the evaluators will have to sustain. As evalua-
tors can anticipate the negative outcomes of judgment expression (link G), such suppressor fac-
tors reduce the likelihood that evaluators choose to express their deviant judgment in public.  
Judgment suppression can work not only through sanctions, but also through incentives. 
The silence of influential actors can sometimes be “bought” with economic rewards, as was the 
case between Enron and its auditor, Andersen Consulting, or with social rewards, such as en-
hanced reputation, high-status affiliation, or improved career prospects. Judgment suppression 
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with rewards is often accomplished through “cooptation” (Selznick, 1949). This arrangement 
improves validity by silencing the opposition and also benefits the co-opted individuals. 
It is important to note that not all evaluators are equally sensitive to each of the suppressor 
factors. Therefore, in the population of silenced evaluators, one can discern segments on the ba-
sis of the factor that motivated them to suppress the expression of their deviant propriety judg-
ment. These segments may overlap as an evaluator may have more than one reason to suppress 
his/her propriety judgment. The simultaneous presence of several suppressor factors that an 
evaluator is sensitive to provides even greater incentive to keep silence or to pretend to adopt the 
institutionalized judgment. Thus, institutional stability can be described as a state of suppressed 
diversity where one or several suppressor factors create a selective pressure on evaluators’ judg-
ments, silencing deviant opinions and encouraging the expression of the institutionalized one.  
From time to time, the dissemination of new information (e.g., scandals, crises, accidents, 
etc.), cultural or political changes (e.g., liberalization, transition to a democracy, or removal of 
censorship) and micro-level changes in actors’ circumstances (changes in economic interests, 
social ties, or power dependencies) may remove one or more suppressor factors, freeing these 
actors to openly express their private propriety judgment. As different types of events remove 
different types of constraints on the judgment expression (see Table 1), they free up different 
segments of the suppressed evaluators’ population to publically express their deviant judgments. 
The emergence of an alternative judgment in public communications signifies the beginning of 
competition among judgments, and hence the emergence of contradictions (Tost, 2011) and de-
stabilization of the institutional order, which, in turn, may result in institutional change.  
Thus, under conditions of stability evaluators are under a strong influence of the estab-
lished validity, and judgment suppression factors are sufficiently effective to deter deviant judg-
ment expression, which helps maintain the illusion of “unanimity” and isomorphism. By con-
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trast, under conditions of institutional change, validity is eroded by the public presence of com-
peting judgments, suppression factors are weakened or removed, and agency and strategic behav-
iours of individuals and collective actors play a prominent role in the legitimacy process.  
THE DYNAMICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: RETURN TO STABILITY  
It should be noted, however, that not all debates and turmoil result in institutional change. 
On the one hand, the positive-feedback institutional stability loop described above favors the sta-
tus quo, as it gives an advantage to the most valid (i.e., most widely accepted) judgment. On the 
other hand, evaluators may lose interest in the issue in question as time passes or as new unrelat-
ed events draw away their attention (Mahon & Waddock, 1992). In this case they are likely to 
automatically revert to the judgment that has the greatest perceived validity, i.e., to the same old 
institutionalized judgment. As a result, at the macro level there is a number of recurring issues 
that from time to time become controversial, but this does not lead to any significant changes in 
institutionalized judgments or practices (Alford, 1975; Mahon & Waddock, 1992).  
Yet, despite these macro-level factors promoting institutional stability, changes in judg-
ments and institutions do occur and micro-level behaviors of individual evaluators can give rise 
to new macro-level validity. As we describe below, micro-level influences on the macro-level 
validity are realized through a non-deterministic competitive process where the proponents of 
two or more judgments on the issue compete for social influence, for diffusion and institutionali-
zation of their judgment using a diverse array of institutional strategies.  
Strategies Influencing Legitimacy Judgments 
For an evaluator, each message that he or she receives serves as a cue suggesting the validi-
ty of the judgment that it conveys (Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001; Tost, 2011). The greater the rela-
tive number and credibility of such cues that an evaluator receives and the greater the diversity of 
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message sources that communicate the same judgment, the greater the probability that he or she 
infers validity of this judgment. As mentioned earlier, it is not the overall “abstract” validity that 
every evaluator is exposed to, it is the perceived validity, or validity belief, that influences the 
evaluator’s own propriety judgment.  
Micro-level validity beliefs naturally exhibit substantial diversity, since not all evaluators 
are equally exposed to the messages of a given source and, as studies in persuasion research sug-
gest (Crano & Prislin, 2006), messages can produce different effect on different evaluators. The 
perceptual nature of validity cues, together with the strong effect of validity on propriety 
(Johnson, 2004; Tost, 2011; Walker et al., 1986; Zelditch, 2006), creates opportunities for strate-
gic manipulations of actors’ judgments. One can distinguish strategies that influence evaluators’ 
validity beliefs and propriety judgments (1) by means of rhetoric, (2) by increasing the credibil-
ity of speakers, (3) by “staging” a consensus for the targeted evaluator, as well as (4) by recourse 
to coercion and inducement.  
Rhetorical strategies address the content of messages used for persuasion. The literature on 
discourse and framing has identified multiple rhetorical strategies that can be divided into those 
addressing validity beliefs (link D in Figures 1 and 2) and those addressing propriety, or more 
precisely, the selection of norms used in rendering the propriety judgments (link E in Figures 1 
and 2).  
Rhetorical strategies influencing validity beliefs (see examples in Table 2) are used by 
judgment proponents to inform the evaluator that many other actors have adopted their preferred 
judgment or to persuade the evaluator that there are no alternatives to this judgment, that it is the 
only valid choice available. By relying on validity cues, evaluators can save mental effort 
(Rosch, 1978) and remain in a passive mode of judgment formation (Tost, 2011). While some 
strategies promote validity by emphasizing judgment adoption by multiple peers (cf. endorse-
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ment - Tost, 2011; Zelditch, 2006), others emphasize judgment adoption by actors in positions of 
authority (cf. authorization - Tost, 2011; Zelditch, 2006). A set of validity-promoting strategies 
also make reference to authorizations that the judgment received in the past. This is accom-
plished by appeals to the tradition and creation of historical or mythological narratives (Golant & 
Sillince, 2007; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). The set of validity-promoting strategies also in-
cludes strategies that encourage the evaluator to infer the judgment’s validity from the lack of 
conceivable alternatives to it (e.g., cosmological and teleological theorizations in Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005), or from analogy with already familiar valid categories (Etzion & Ferraro, 
2010; Lakoff, 2004).  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 Rhetorical strategies that directly influence the propriety judgments of individual evalua-
tors (see examples in Table 2) appeal to emotions, normative beliefs, and rational calculus of 
evaluators to promote the appropriateness of applying a given set of norms to the issue in ques-
tion. Such strategies emphasize the positive outcomes of adopting a given judgment (Haack, 
Schoeneborn & Wickert, 2012; Vaara, 2002; Zbaracki, 1998) or negative aspects of the compet-
ing alternatives, such as the status quo (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Hardy & Maguire, 2010). The 
positive outcomes of advocated judgment adoption can be both pragmatic, i.e., providing greater 
utility to the evaluator(s) (Green, 2004; Vaara & Tienari, 2008; Vaara, Tienari & Laurila, 2006; 
Zbaracki, 1998) or moral, i.e., ensuring fairness or better congruence with social norms and be-
lief systems (Elsbach, 1994; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). 
Credibility strategies. Not all message sources are equally credible and influential 
(Cameron, 2009; Hardy & Clegg, 1996). Individuals occupying particular subject positions 
(Maguire et al., 2004; Mantere & Vaara, 2008), such as a position of authority (regulators, legis-
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lators, and judges) or positions with greater access to communication distribution channels (jour-
nalists, media companies’ executives), as well as experts (Bonardi & Keim, 2005), celebrities 
(Rindova, Pollock, & Hayward, 2006), and high-status actors (Gould, 2002; Ridgeway, Boyle, 
Kuipers, & Robinson, 1998), have a disproportionately large influence on other evaluators’ per-
ceptions of judgment validity. The more influential these actors are, the stronger the validity cue 
their messages convey. For this reason, an important part of institutional competition is the com-
petition for occupation of such influential “subject positions” (Maguire et al., 2004) and competi-
tion for creation of expertise and authority (Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012) that allows actors to in-
crease their credibility and influence on the judgments of others.  
“Staging” a consensus for influential actors. The effects of credibility described above 
imply that the more influential the evaluator, the harder the proponents of competing discourses 
will strive to win his or her mind. Although some influential actors, such as celebrities, can 
sometimes be paid to promote a specific judgment, most actors in influential subject positions 
are expected to form their own independent propriety judgments, and therefore require persua-
sion. Since validity has a strong effect on individual evaluators’ propriety judgments (Zelditch & 
Walker, 2000), the persuasion of a single influential actor can be accomplished by creating a 
perception of validity of a given judgment by means of focused communication to this actor 
through multiple channels and on behalf of different sources. Regulators and legislators, who are 
among the most important grantors of validity in society, often find themselves targeted with 
communications by competing interest groups (Baron & Diermeier, 2007). The political strate-
gies literature (Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986) has de-
scribed a number of specific strategies of such validity “staging” that are used to manipulate a 
regulator’s perception of the majority’s preferences on a given issue. Lobbying, or direct com-
munication to a regulator (often by multiple lobbyists), constituency building (i.e., communica-
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tion through mobilized third parties to create an appearance of an “independent voice”), advoca-
cy advertizing (discourse communication through mass media), as well as petitions, demonstra-
tions and mail campaigns, have been identified as means to influence regulator’s judgments 
(Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986). 
There is some evidence that judgments of other actors in influential subject positions are 
also affected by such validity staging strategies. Thus, it has been observed that judges are sensi-
tive to media coverage, which prompts some lawyers to argue their cases in the media before 
courtroom hearings (LoPucki & Weyrauch, 2000). Similarly, judgments of stock analysts and 
investors were shown to be influenced by the media (Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Tetlock, 2007; 
Zhu and Westphal, 2011). 
If successful, these validity staging strategies create a bias in how an influential evaluator 
perceives the normative preferences of other constituents (Keim & Zeithaml, 1986) and this, in 
turn, can influence his or her own propriety judgment on the issue. When an influential evaluator 
communicates his or her strategically manipulated propriety judgment through discourse and ac-
tions (link D), other actors receive a strong signal of validity of that judgment. As this signal 
prompts evaluators to accept the validity judgment (link C) and thus follow the passive-
processing path (Tost, 2011), the institutional stability loop creates a cascading effect of this 
judgment adoption by others. As more and more actors adopt the judgment and express it in their 
discourse, the validity of this judgment grows, until the opposition to it ceases to exist or is co-
erced (link K) to suppress the expression of their opinion (link M).  
Coercion and inducement. Persuasion works not only through the quality and quantity of 
communication as described above, but also through coercion and inducement. There are costs 
and benefits associated with public expression of a particular judgment, since expressed opinions 
create positive or negative reputational effects and other social consequences for those who ex-
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press them (Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Kuran, 1987). While the use of coercive means is mostly 
associated with authorities, minority activists promoting their discourse also find ways to punish 
their opponents and reward supporters (Kuran, 1987) by creating judgment suppressor factors 
(see Table 1 above) for those who publicly disagree with them. Public shaming and media at-
tacks to cause reputational damage, legal action (such as SLAPP – see Table 1), and even terror-
ist threats are sometimes used by minority judgment proponents to suppress the opposition.  
It should be noted that all actors, including the government, are vulnerable to coercive in-
fluence. Even for the government the costs associated with judgment expression (and hence vali-
dation of it) can be prohibitive. Validation of an unpopular judgment erodes the legitimacy of the 
government’s authority and makes it vulnerable to attacks and criticism from other actors in so-
ciety (including the media and the legal system). This is the reason why politicians often avoid 
expressing judgments on issues that strongly divide the electorate (Downs, 1957). And this is the 
reason why regulators, even if they are very friendly with the companies they regulate, are lim-
ited in what they can do to serve industry interests on widely salient issues (Bonardi & Keim, 
2005).  
Stabilization of the Legitimacy Process 
The instability of the legitimacy process does not last forever. Once one judgment, 
propelled by the support of the majority or by the strategies described above, takes the 
substantial lead in validity, the positive feedback mechanism built into the institutional stability 
loop creates further and further advantage to this judgment. The perception of its greater validity 
(link D) translates, in turn, into its increasingly stronger influence on the evaluators’ propriety 
judgments. As a result, controversies over legitimacy of a given organization or organizational 
category subside over time and one judgment emerges as the “consensus” opinion of most 
members of society. Thus, the positive feedback mechanism of the institutional stability loop 
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returns the legitimacy process to the state of stability.  
As we have mentioned earlier, validity can be created not only by persuading the majority, 
but also by obtaining validation from influential actors, especially those in subject positions 
associated with the media, regulators and the legal system. The deployment of influence 
strategies described above to target those influential actors may lead to a situation where the 
judgment that is perceived as most valid is not the judgment of the majority, but the judgment 
advanced by a well-organized and/or well-financed minority group. In other words, the judgment 
advanced by such a minority can dominate the unorganized majority’s judgment. The literature 
on collective action (Olson, 1965) and political strategies (Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005; 
Hillman & Hitt, 1999) described multiple situations where the policy preferences of a minority 
group dominate the interests of the unorganized majority. In the domain of legitimacy 
judgments, such domination creates “preference falsification” (Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Kuran, 
1987) or “pluralistic ignorance” (Zhu & Westphal, 2011) as the majority of evaluators suppress 
the expression of their propriety judgment on the false assumption that it represents a minority 
opinion (see also Centola et al., 2005). Although this process results in institutional stability and 
in the institutionalization of the minority’s judgment, suppressed judgments do not disappear 
completely: Like seeds in the soil they remain invisible until an opportune moment arises when 
the suppressor factor(s) silencing evaluators are removed, and a new period of institutional 
turmoil and contestation begins. Thus, an institutionalized order exerts a powerful influence on 
evaluators’ judgments, yet it is inherently fragile as it is “inhabited” by evaluators that have the 
capacity to reassess and eventually change this social order (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; 
Stinchcombe, 1997).  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
The Multi-Level Nature of Institutional Processes 
The theoretical framework proposed here emphasizes the multi-level nature of institutional 
processes. Although the recent call of institutional theorists to explore the micro-foundations of 
institutions implies a multi-level conceptualisation of institutional processes (Jepperson, 1991; 
Powell & Colyvas, 2008), the issue of levels has received surprisingly little attention in institu-
tional research. Yet, the processes of institutionalization, maintenance, and demise of the institu-
tional order cannot be fully understood without attention to communication and cognition of in-
dividuals at the micro level and without exploration of interactions between individuals and mac-
ro-level institutions. 
An important contribution of this paper to the advancement of research on social judgments 
(Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011) is the development of a multi-level theory of the legitimacy 
process. The process model presented in Figures 1 and 2 illustrates the cross-level mechanisms 
that maintain stability and isomorphism in legitimacy judgments and the mechanisms that 
promote legitimacy change. Recognizing that institutions are socially constructed templates not 
only for action (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), but also for legitimacy 
judgments, we have shown how under conditions of stability DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) 
“iron cage” extends to legitimacy judgments made by evaluators. We have described a cross-
level institutional stability loop, which, through a positive feedback mechanism, ensures the 
stability and persistence of the institutional order. 
The Legitimacy Process under Conditions of Institutional Stability and Change 
We have drawn researchers’ attention to fundamentally different social processes that un-
fold under conditions of institutional stability and change. Under conditions of stability, the legit-
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imacy process is dominated by top-down, macro-to-micro influences that reinforce validity, the 
institutionalized legitimacy judgment, and inhibit the development and public expression of de-
viant propriety judgments by individual evaluators. By contrast, under conditions of institutional 
change, validity is weakened by the presence of competing judgments and micro-level processes 
play a prominent role in reshaping the social order.  
The distinction of these two conditions affects not only theory, but also methods and 
measures that can be meaningfully used in exploration of relationships in the legitimacy process. 
Thus, the top-down, macro-to-micro influence processes, which prevail under conditions of sta-
bility, are amenable to quantification, and a number of measures, such as media tone 
(Deephouse, 1996; Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Vergne, 2011), regulator’s certifications (Baum 
& Oliver, 1991; Deephouse, 1996; Deephouse & Carter, 2005), or ties with other actors (Bitek-
tine, 2011; Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986), can be used to capture the validity component of le-
gitimacy at the macro level. However, under conditions of institutional change, these measures 
may reflect outdated social norms and falsified preferences (Kuran, 1995), which may not pro-
vide an adequate representation of the diversity of competing judgments held by members of so-
ciety. In exploration of the legitimacy process under conditions of institutional change, qualita-
tive case studies can shed light on the process of social construction of a new validity and exper-
imental research can establish factors and conditions that prompt evaluators to openly express 
their deviant judgments. Furthermore, agent-based modeling, or the computer simulation of “the 
behaviors of adaptive actors who make up a social system and who influence one another 
through their interactions” (Harrison, Carroll, & Carley, 2007: 1237), can help explore the com-
plexity of interactions between actors that leads to the institutionalization of a new judgment, the 
creation of a new validity.  
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The Dynamics of Institutional Change 
The explanation of the dynamics of institutional change poses an important challenge to in-
stitutional theory. This challenge was summarized in the paradox of embedded agency (Battilana 
et al., 2009; Green & Li, 2011; Seo & Creed, 2002): How can actors conditioned by institutions 
enact change to those institutions? We have argued that from the multi-level theory perspective, 
the paradox of embedded agency is grounded in the assumption of isomorphism at the micro lev-
el. However, the observed macro-level consensus around the institutionalized norms may con-
ceal a large diversity of suppressed judgments, unobserved actions and clandestine practices. An 
important implication of the proposed multi-level approach to the paradox of embedded agency 
is that, in order to avoid ecological fallacy (Slater et al., 2006) in institutional theory research, 
observations over macro-level homogeneity should not be used to automatically infer homogene-
ity in individual actors’ judgments and actions.  
Our observations on legitimacy judgment expression by individual evaluators suggest that 
even if individuals conform to the institutionalized norm (such as the validity judgment), their 
privately held propriety judgments may vary substantially, as do the reasons for suppressing the 
expression of these judgments (see Table 1). Furthermore, as soon as the factors preventing devi-
ant judgment expression are sufficiently weakened, the evaluators will publicly express their de-
viant judgments, thereby contributing to the destabilisation of the institutional order. Our obser-
vations over judgment suppression and suppressor factor removal lay the ground for the devel-
opment of a theory of institutional suppression. Approaching institutional order as a state of sup-
pressed diversity, researchers can explore factors that induce individual evaluators to suppress 
the public expression of their private propriety judgments (or abstain from actions), as well as 
ways to remove or mitigate the effect of those factors and thereby encourage deviant judgment 
expression.  
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Our conceptualization of judgment suppression also draws attention to the coercive nature 
of institutions. Through the process of institutionalization, legitimacy judgments of evaluators 
are subjected to social control. We suggest that institutionalization of legitimacy judgments (i.e., 
the formation of macro-level validity) operates not only through rhetoric (Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005) and discursive construction (Vaara & Tienari, 2011), but also through coer-
cion (by punishing evaluators for deviant judgment expression - see Table 1), inducement (by 
rewarding conformance), and through selective diffusion of information (by withholding infor-
mation that can negatively affect evaluators’ propriety judgments). Thus, the macro-level “con-
sensus” around the institutionalized validity judgment is driven not only by evaluators’ cultural 
beliefs and value systems (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Suchman, 1995), but also by their fear, 
greed and ignorance. These overlooked factors play an important role in both the maintenance of 
a stable institutional order, and in the competition among judgments in the periods of institution-
al turmoil, when different interest groups use multiple strategies and coercive means to advance 
their preferred judgment and silence the opponents. 
Propriety, Validity and Institutional Strategies 
While the extant institutional theory literature is concerned primarily with the effect of 
institutional strategies on macro-level institutions and organizational outcomes (Battilana et al., 
2009; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Phillips et al., 2004), the multi-
level approach to institutional processes, which we propose here, calls for attention to the effects 
of institutional strategies on individual evaluators and their legitimacy judgments, which, in turn, 
affect the observed macro-level outcomes.  
Our theory adds important insights to previous works on legitimation and institutional 
agency by distinguishing institutional strategies that influence individual evaluators’ validity 
beliefs and propriety judgments – the two fundamental elements of legitimacy judgments 
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(Dornbusch & Scott, 1975; Tost, 2011; Zelditch & Walker, 2000). We have described how 
rhetorical strategies, validity staging, as well as coercion and inducement are used to create a 
perception of a judgment’s greater validity and, through the effect of validity on propriety, to 
manipulate an evaluator’s propriety judgment. We also showed how multiple rhetorical strategies 
identified in the literature on discourse and framing (Green & Li, 2011; Kaplan 2008; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005; Vaara & Tienari, 2008) affect validity beliefs and propriety judgments of 
evaluators (see Tables 2 and 3).  
Future Research Directions 
The theory presented here opens up important avenues for future research. We have 
identified a number of cross-level interactions in the legitimacy process that can be explored in 
empirical research using both qualitative and quantitative methods. More specifically, future 
qualitative research on social judgments could explore the competitive processes of judgment 
validation, where micro-level communication and action yield macro-level outcomes reflected in 
judgments expressed by the media, government authorities, and judges.  
The cross-level social dynamics can also be explored using quantitative methods. The 
macro-level measures of legitimacy judgments validated by the media (Barron, 1998; 
Deephouse, 1996; Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Lamertz & Baum, 1998; Vergne, 2011), 
government agencies (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Deephouse, 1996; Deephouse & Carter, 2005; 
Singh et al., 1986) and self-regulatory bodies, such as industry and professional associations 
(Ruef & Scott, 1998; Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997), can be complemented with micro-
level measures of individual legitimacy judgments obtained through surveys and experimental 
studies. Such studies can provide important insights into the interactions between propriety and 
validity and build the empirical foundation for the multi-level theory of the legitimacy process.  
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Of particular interest for future research is the exploration of discourse suppressor factors 
that discourage the expression of deviant judgments and create the impression of “consensus” in 
the organizational field. The processes of deployment and removal of such factors have received 
little attention of researchers. Yet, understanding these factors is essential not only for 
maintaining the social order, but also for creating favorable conditions for institutional change. 
Our conceptualization of suppressor factors opens up interesting research opportunities at micro 
and macro levels. More specifically, at the macro level, there is a question of “What do 
institutional entrepreneurs, regulators and other actors do to remove the suppressor factors from 
the social environment?” At the micro level, fundamental questions for conceptual and empirical 
research are “How do evaluators assess the degree of deviance of their judgments? How do they 
interpret environmental signals as a suppressor factor removal? How do they make a decision to 
speak up?” The psychology research on positive anticipation and trust (Colquitt, Scott, & 
LePine, 2007; McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 
1998), research on issue framing (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009), as well as research in economics on 
preference falsification (Kuran, 1995) can inform our understanding of the socio-cognitive 
processes that prompt individual evaluators to speak up and express their deviant judgments. 
Future research in this direction should examine mental and behavioral thresholds of individual 
evaluators, i.e. the points at which evaluators switch from passive-mode to active-mode 
processing (Tost, 2011) and the points at which they decide to engage in action and express their 
privately held judgments. Another point that merits further scrutiny refers to the question of 
generalizability of our theory to different cultural contexts. Future research should explore 
whether actors in collectivist and individualist societies (Hofstede, 2010) react differently to 
suppressor factors. Comparative, cross-cultural studies will shed light on this important issue.  
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Finally, while we focus here on processes driving stability and change in micro-level legit-
imacy judgments and in macro-level organizational legitimacy, the proposed multilevel theory 
has broader implications for institutional theory and communications, as similar cross-level pro-
cesses control stability and change of other types of institutions in society. Exploration of other 
institutional processes, such as institutional work and institutional entrepreneurship, using a mul-
tilevel approach and the conceptual framework developed here offers another important avenue 
for future research stemming from this paper. 
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NOTES 
1
 It is important to note that while we treat conformity vs. deviance as a categorical distinction 
throughout this paper, such an assumption represents an analytical simplification. The degree of 
a judgment’s deviance is also determined by perceptions and may vary across evaluators and 
across contexts.  
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     Table 1. Some Examples of Factors Preventing Expression of Deviant Judgments 
Factor Mode of action Observations in the literature How the factor can be removed  
Lack of 
interest / 
know-ledge 
- Prevents active, evaluative (Tost, 2011) mode of 
judgment formation (links A-B)  
- Increases the influence of perceptions of macro-level 
validity (links D-C), thereby promoting the status quo. 
- Voters in a democracy may have little incentive to 
become informed about most policy-making issues and 
therefore may follow the opinions of others (Bonardi & 
Keim, 2005; Kuran, 1987). 
- Wide dissemination of information:  media attention 
(Pollock & Rindova, 2003), vocal issue champions 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2009); use of agenda setting strategies 
(Kingdon, 1984), creation of crises (Alford, 1975) 
Censorship 
of commu-
nication 
channels 
- Prevents evaluative (Tost, 2011) mode of judgment 
formation (links A and B) by withholding important 
information and  
- Limits opponents’ access to the media (link I) and 
thereby constrains the diffusion of competing judg-
ments, creates a perception of their low validity (D). 
- Cascades of false enforcement of an unpopular norm 
depend on the spread of misinformation about the distri-
bution of support for the norm (Centola et al., 2005). 
- Democratization and liberalization of society, abolition of 
censorship,  
- Emergence of new uncensored communication channels 
(e.g., Internet and social media). 
Threat of 
sanctions by 
an authority 
- Suppresses deviant judgment expression (link M) as 
the cost of sanctions to the evaluator exceeds the benefit 
that can be expected from judgment expression. 
- “Social sanctions are aimed not just at actions against 
the system but also at expressions of disagreement” 
(Kuran, 1987: 662), see also Milgram, 1974). 
- Democratization and liberalization of society, interna-
tional support for dissidents.  
Peer pres-
sure / threat 
of social 
disapproval 
- As actors in the evaluator’s immediate surrounding 
uniformly express a particular “valid” judgment (link F), 
they create social pressure on the evaluator (link D) to 
conform to their opinion. Ostracism and other forms of 
social disapproval can be regarded as “sanctions” im-
posed by these actors on those who express a deviant 
judgment. This causes a suppression of a deviant judg-
ment expression (link M) by individual evaluators. 
- “People who believe that they hold a minority opinion 
tend to conceal their views in public” (Noelle-Neumann 
& Petersen, 2004: 541) 
- Experiments reported by Asch (1956) show that sub-
jects conform to a consensus judgment they know to be 
false rather than risk social isolation. 
- Unpopular norms diffuse because actors, while private-
ly disapproving of these norms, publically endorse and 
enforce these norms to signal conformance (Centola et 
al.,  2005; Willer, Kuwabara & Macy, 2009) 
- Cultural shifts towards greater tolerance of diversity and 
non-conformity. 
- Establishing strong ties: Cascades of self-reinforcing 
support for a highly unpopular norm cannot occur in a 
fully connected social network (Centola et al., 2005). 
Threat of 
legal action 
by affected 
actors 
- Causes suppression of deviant judgment expression 
(link M) as the cost of litigation and potential legal sanc-
tions exceeds the benefit that evaluators can expect from 
judgment expression. 
- Legal action to suppress individual’s public discourse 
has been termed SLAPP (Selective Litigation Against 
Public Participation). Such litigation loads vocal activ-
ists with costs of legal defence. This tactic is used by 
many corporations to silence opponents (Abrams, 1989). 
- Media coverage of violations of the right to free speech 
by SLAPP plaintiffs discourages SLAPPs and/or predis-
poses judges in favour of the defendants. 
- Anti-SLAPP laws: in California a defendant to file a 
motion to strike a complaint when it arises from conduct 
that falls within the rights of petition or free speech.  
Threat of 
criminal 
attacks 
- Causes suppression of deviant judgment expression 
(link M) as the private cost to a victim of a politically-
motivated crime exceeds the benefit that he/she can 
expect from the deviant judgment expression. 
- Actors expressing a particular discourse may get tar-
geted by criminal attacks of their opponents: death 
threats, crimes against property, murder attempts, etc.  
Reduced crime, antiterrorist measures, witness protection, 
restraining orders, law enforcement. 
Reputation-
al concerns 
Causes suppression of deviant judgment expression (link 
M) as the expression of a deviant judgment creates an 
opportunity cost of foregone career opportunities, ac-
ceptance into a higher status group, or lost respect by 
peers. 
- Individuals who occupy (or seek to occupy) a certain 
subject position (e.g., experts, regulators, or reporters) 
may follow other influential actors, going against their 
private preference, not as a result of ignorance, but ra-
ther to earn professional and social approval or to avoid 
disapproval (Bonardi & Keim, 2005). 
- Actors with low or high status (as opposed to those with 
middle status) may have a lesser incentive to conform 
(Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001) and hence are more likely to 
express deviant opinions. For this reason, it is usually 
high-status actors (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) or pe-
ripheral players (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 
1991) who initiate institutional change. 
Perception 
of futility 
Suppresses deviant judgment expression (link M). When 
probability of success is perceived as low, the invested 
effort and the personal costs of sustained sanctions ex-
ceed the expected benefits from judgment expression. 
Individuals who do not believe that their action can pro-
duce the desired change will likely abstain from futile 
action. “Numeric strength” is required to attain change 
(Kuran, 1995).  
- Establishing strong ties: people are more informed of the 
judgments of others in a fully connected social network 
(Centola et al.,  2005; Zhu & Westphal, 2011).  
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Table 2. Rhetorical Strategies Promoting Propriety 
 
Strategies promoting propriety Subtypes and examples 
Strategies stressing the success of 
a specific entity, e.g. that a prac-
tice offers an appropriate and 
efficient solution to a problem of 
societal concern or that it fails to 
offer such a solution (theoriza-
tion) 
 
 
 
- Success and failure narratives – e.g., to make sense of the spread of man-
agement practices (Haack et al., 2012; Zbaracki, 1998) or of post-merger 
integration (Vaara, 2002).  
- Problem discourse and solution discourse - e.g., in the spread of quality 
circles in the United States (Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999). 
- Problematizing the ineffectiveness and injustice of existing practices 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Hardy & Maguire, 2010). 
- Rationalization - providing rational arguments and references to utility to 
establish propriety (Green, 2004; Vaara & Tienari, 2008; Vaara, Tienari & 
Laurila, 2006; Zbaracki, 1998). 
Strategies that create resonance 
with normative beliefs of evalua-
tors  
 
 
- Frame alignment - the process to make issue interpretations congruent with 
the prevalent local accounts (Benford & Snow, 2000; Creed, Scully & Aus-
tin, 2002; Gamson, 1992; Meyer & Hoellerer, 2010). Frames in communica-
tion need to match frames in thought (Chong & Druckman, 2007), to recog-
nize commonsense categories or scripts to rationalize collective experience 
(Golant & Sillince, 2007; Lakoff, 2004; Scott, 1995). 
- Value-based theorization drawing on appeals to norms drawn from wider 
belief systems (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), reference to institutional 
norms and logics (Elsbach, 1994; Ruef & Scott, 1998), linking discourse to 
orders of worth, or higher-order principles that define appropriate forms of 
behavior (Patriotta, Gond & Schultz, 2011).  
Strategies constructing identities 
to confer or destroy the propriety 
of an entity   
 
- Valorizing and demonizing actors (Hardy & Maguire, 2010; Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006). 
- Idealizing as construction of an actor’s identity as conditional on carrying 
out ideal behaviors (Hardy & Maguire, 2010). 
Strategies emphasizing the moral 
value of the focal entity  
 
- Ethos justification stressing the importance of considering the important 
role of justice and ethics in judgments (Green, 2004). 
- Moralization as strategy establishing propriety by moral arguments (Vaara 
& Monin, 2010). 
Strategies addressing emotions 
 
- Pathos justifications characterized by passionate appeals (Green, 2004; 
Sillince, 1999). 
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Table 3. Rhetorical Strategies Promoting Validity 
 
Strategies promoting validity  Subtypes and examples 
Strategies emphasizing en-
dorsement,  i.e., stressing that a 
majority or an increasing num-
ber of actors approve of the 
entity  
 
- Bandwagon discourse - supporting the material spread of manage-
ment techniques (Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999, Kieser, 1997; 
Zbaracki, 1998).  
- Commitment discourse - emphasizing the strong support of the entity 
by the evaluator, e.g., announcing the future implementation of man-
agement practices in financial institutions (Haack, Schoeneborn & 
Wickert, 2012). 
Strategies emphasizing authori-
zation,  i.e., stressing that the 
entity is approved and support-
ed by regulators or other influ-
ential actors 
- Authorizing actors to speak on behalf of less powerful actors (Hardy 
& Maguire, 2010). 
- Authorization as referring to the authority of law, regulations, or per-
sons holding expertise or power (Vaara & Monin, 2010; Vaara & 
Tienari, 2008; Vaara, Tienari & Laurila, 2006; Elsbach, 1994). 
Strategies stressing that a de-
velopment or an entity is inevi-
table and natural  
 
 
- Cosmological theorization - presenting change as a natural (and 
hence valid) development (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), rendering 
something natural by discursive means (Vaara & Monin, 2010). For 
example, an antenarrative stressing the inevitability of globalization 
(Vaara & Tienari, 2011). 
- Teleological theorization - suggesting that certain events must occur 
within the context of some ultimate valid objective (Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005). 
Strategies promoting favoura-
ble categorization 
- Ontological theorization - stressing what an entity is vs. what an enti-
ty is not and which entities can or cannot co-exist (Suddaby & Green-
wood, 2005). This theorization enables entities to position themselves 
in favourable categories and benefit from legitimacy spill-over from 
the category to the individual member. 
Strategies centered on story-
telling and historical narrative 
- Historical theorization - appealing to history and tradition as a source 
of validity (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). 
- Mythopoesis / Narrativization - increasing validity through story-
telling, creation of myths and histories (Golant & Sillince, 2007); 
Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999; Suddaby, 
Foster & Mills, 2014; Vaara, Tienari & Laurila, 2006). 
Strategies based on tropes 
(mostly on metaphor)  
 
- Analogical reasoning as legitimizing unknown entities by connecting 
them to a familiar source domain (Sillince & Barker, 2012; 
Cornelissen & Clarke, 2010; Etzion & Ferraro, 2010; Lakoff, 2004; 
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). 
- Framing the new in terms of the familiar (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; 
Navis & Glynn, 2010). 
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Figure 1. A Multi-level Model of Legitimacy under Conditions  
of Institutional Stability 
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